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Abstract
With the extensive applications of machine learning, the issue of pri-
vate or sensitive data in the training examples becomes more and more
serious: during the training process, personal information or habits may
be disclosed to unexpected persons or organisations, which can cause se-
rious privacy problems or even financial loss. In this paper, we present a
quantum privacy-preserving algorithm for machine learning with percep-
tron. There are mainly two steps to protect original training examples.
Firstly when checking the current classifier, quantum tests are employed
to detect data user’s possible dishonesty. Secondly when updating the cur-
rent classifier, private random noise is used to protect the original data.
The advantages of our algorithm are: (1) it protects training examples bet-
ter than the known classical methods; (2) it requires no quantum database
and thus is easy to implement.
1 Introduction
Privacy-preserving machine learning and data mining has been a very active
research area during the past two decades, with various algorithms developed
for privacy-preserving recommender systems [21], logistic regression [6], decision
tree learning [2], association rule mining [8, 23], information sharing across
private databases [1], just name a few. In particular, they found lots of successful
applications in the real world, for instance, banking, social media, storage, and
supermarket shopping [2, 6, 8].
Quantum algorithms have been proved to be faster than their classical coun-
terparts for several important tasks. For example, Grover algorithm [12] can
search in an unstructured database with a quadratic speedup over any classical
algorithm. Based on it, a quantum algorithm for counting was proposed in [5].
Recently, quantum computing stepped into the area of machine learning. A
quantum support vector machine was developed in [20] for big data classifica-
tion. A quantum algorithm based on quantum random access memory [11] was
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presented in [15] for supervised and unsupervised machine learning. In [26], a
quantum deep learning algorithm was devised by generalizing the Boltzmann
machine. Employing Grover search algorithm, a quantum perceptron model
was introduced in [14] that is able to find training examples, which cannot be
classified by the current classifiers correctly, faster than classical methods. On
the other hand, several quantum protocols have been proposed for protecting
security and privacy in communication and computation, for instance quantum
key distribution BB84 [4], quantum private queries [10], quantum bit escrow[3],
quantum bit commitment [13], and coin tossing [7]. All these quantum secu-
rity protocols has a common procedure: they first prepare quantum states on
random bases, and finally perform measurements on the post-action states to
detect dishonesty or cheat.
This paper aims to develop a quantum algorithm for privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning. As a starting point, we focus on perceptron [22], which is the
simplest model of artificial neural networks. The distinctive features of our
protocol are summarised as follows:
• It preserves the privacy of the data provider better than the known clas-
sical methods. We propose two different ways to protect the private infor-
mation of training examples in the two steps of the perceptron algorithm.
In the first step (Step S1 in Sec 5.1), quantum tests are employed to
detect if the data user was trying to extract information about training
examples by performing quantum measurements. Once such a dishonesty
is detected, the data provider will terminate the entire protocol to prevent
further information leakage. In the second step (Step S2 in Sec 5.1), the
data provider publishes a distorted training example for the data user to
update classifiers, a technique widely used in classical algorithms. The
key difference to those classical algorithms in this step is that the random
noise is private, i.e., unknown to the data user. This makes the data user
unable to recover the original data. Remarkably, numerical results show
that our quantum protocol can tolerate much more noise, thus providing
stronger privacy protection, than classical methods such as [2], while still
returning the correct result.
• The quantum algorithms for searching, counting and machine learning [5,
10, 12, 14, 15, 20, 26] require a quantum database. But our protocol does
not assume a quantum database. Instead, it only makes use of a classical
one which contains the training examples. Furthermore, no entanglement
is required, except in the testing round for the data provider to detect
possible dishonest behaviors of the data user. Therefore, our protocol is
much easier to implement.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides necessary pre-
liminaries. In Section 3, we present a quantum privacy-preserving data system
for computing a linear function f(x), which is the basis of the perceptron model.
A theoretical analysis of the privacy level of this algorithm is given in Section 4.
Then in Section 5, the data system is deployed to the perceptron model of ma-
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chine learning. The correctness of the quantum privacy-preserving perceptron
algorithm, some further privacy analysis and numerical experiments are also pre-
sented. A comparison with classical algorithms and other quantum algorithms
for a similar purpose is given in Section 6. A more detailed description of our al-
gorithm, proofs of theorems, and more numerical experiments and comparisons
are showed in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Works
This paper is a continuation of our previous works [28, 29]. The differences
between this paper and [28, 29] are as follows. First, the problem considered in
this paper is machine learning with perceptron. In contrast, the problem dealt
with in [28, 29] is association rule mining: [28] is for semi-honest agents on
vertically partitioned databases, and [29] for dishonest agents on a centralized
database. Second, the approaches are different. For mining association rules,
quantum circuits are deployed to encode private information for semi-honest
agents [28] and quantum tests are employed to detect cheat of dishonest agents
[29]. But when learning a perceptron, classical training vectors have to be used
to update the current classifier. This will cause privacy leakage. So the method
in [28, 29] cannot be directly employed to preserve privacy in perceptron learning.
Therefore, in this paper, a new quantum protocol is presented.
2 Preliminary
We assume the readers have some basic background in quantum computation.
For more details, we refer to [17]. In this section, we very briefly recall the
problem of privacy-preserving machine learning and the perceptron model, with
the main aim being to fix notations.
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Many privacy-preserving problems in machine learning and data mining such
as association rule mining and decision tree learning [2, 8, 23] can be reduced
to the following problem:
Problem 1. Let f : Rk → {0, 1} be a function privately held by Bob, and ~x
an input for f privately held by Alice. How can Alice and Bob collaboratively
compute f(~x) without the information about ~x leaked to Bob?
2.2 Perceptron
Perceptron [22] is a linear classifier and the simplest model of artificial neural
networks. It solves the following problem based on a training set [9, 22]:
Problem 2. Let D = 〈(~x1, c1), · · · , (~xN , cN )〉 be a training set where each ~xi =
(xi,1, xi,2, · · · , xi,k) ∈ Rk is a training vector and ci ∈ {0, 1} is the class it
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• Initialize ~w = 0 and b = 0.
• Execute the following loop until no update happens.
– For i = 1, · · · , N , do the following two steps:
1. (Step S1) Calculate di = f(~xi) (Eq. (1)) with current ~w and b.
2. (Step S2) If di 6= ci, update ~w ← ~w + (ci − di)~xi and b ←
b+ (ci − di).
• Output ~w and b.
Figure 1: The perceptron algorithm on a training set [9, 22].
belongs to. The problem is how to find a function/classifier
f(~x) =
{
1 if ~w · ~x+ b > 0,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where ~w = (w1, · · · , wk) ∈ Rk and b ∈ R, such that for every training vector ~xi,
f(~xi) = ci.
The perceptron algorithm dealing with this problem can be briefly summa-
rized as in Figure 1. It is shown in [18] that if such a f exists, the original
perceptron algorithm terminates up to a bounded number of updates (i.e., Step
S2).
2.3 Privacy Metric
For the purpose of privacy analysis, a privacy metric is necessary. In this paper,
we use the privacy metric defined in [2]. It can be formalized as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Privacy metric [2]). We say an attribute x ∈ R in a training
example has a privacy amount l at c% confidence level, if l is the minimum
number such that the data user can estimate with c% confidence that x ∈ [a, a+l]
for some a ∈ R.
In [2], the privacy amount l is only determined by the random noise added
onto the original training examples. Suppose the noise r, which will be added
onto x, is generated uniformly at random from [−δ, δ]. Then we say x has a
privacy amount l = 2cδ100 with confidence c%. For instance, if the confidence is
95%, i.e., c = 95, the privacy amount is 1.9δ.
Remark 1. Note for some special training examples, the privacy amount may
decrease after the mining procedure. Suppose, ~xj = (xj,1, xj,2) = (20, 5) is a
training example of class 1, and uniformly distributed random noise r ∈ [−5, 5]
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is added onto xj,1 to protect xj,1. So generally xj,1 has privacy amount 9.5 with
confidence 95%. Now we further assume, after the mining or learning procedure,
the data user finds that 99% of training examples ~xi of class 1 has the property
xi,1 > 19. Then the data user can conclude that xj,1 > 19 with 99% confidence.
Thus the privacy amount should be 0.99(20 + 5− 19) = 5.94 < 9.5.
Usually it is very hard to analyse the influence of the mining results on the
privacy amount, since it depends on the specific problem. In [2], this influence
is not considered. So we do not consider this influence either.
3 A Quantum Privacy-Preserving Data System
As stated in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to develop a quantum
algorithm based on perceptron for machine learning. Our strategy is as follows:
in this section, we present a quantum data system that protects privacy in
computing a generic linear function f(~x) in Problem 1. Such a data system will
be incorporated into the perceptron model for machine learning in Section 5.
3.1 The Design Idea
The basic idea for protecting Alice’s privacy is similar to the common procedure
used in [3, 4, 7, 10, 13], which we mentioned in the introduction: Alice asks Bob
to send back his state and then check it. But this idea is extended for our purpose
in the following way: Alice asks Bob to perform three rounds of computation
of f , one with the real data ~x and the other two with a randomly chosen test
input. As the information about which round is for real computation and which
rounds are merely for testing is kept secret from Bob, his attempt of attack (by
performing measurement on the quantum systems received from Alice) will be
detected by Alice with nonzero probability. It starts from the following simple
observation.
Example 3.1. During the computation of f(~x), Alice sends the input ~x encoded
as a quantum state |ψ〉 to Bob, and Bob computes the result on an ancilla qubit
added after receiving |ψ〉. Alice may check whether Bob cheats if Bob is required
to send back all qubits to Alice. For instance, if Alice sends an entangled state
1√
2
(|~x〉 + |~y〉) with ~x 6= ~y instead of the original data |~x〉 to Bob, then two
situations arise after Bob performs the function f on the states and sends them
back to Alice:
• If Bob is honest, Alice receives 1√
2
(|~x〉|f(~x)〉+ |~y〉|f(~y)〉).
• If Bob is dishonest, that is he performs the projective measurement {|~z〉 :
~z ∈ {0, 1}k} to learn Alice’s input, he will obtain ~x or ~y, each with proba-
bility 1/2. However, since Bob does not know either ~x or ~y prior to mea-
surements, he cannot make sure what indeed the measurement outcome is,
and he cannot recover the expected state 1√
2
(|~x〉|f(~x)〉 + |~y〉|f(~y)〉). Thus
Alice will be able to detect his dishonesty with probability 0.5.
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Note that since Alice does not know either f(~x) or f(~y) before her final
measurement, she cannot distinguish these two situations directly. But we fur-
ther observe that if Bob performs a measurement to read information, the final
state is either |~x〉|f(~x)〉 or |~y〉|f(~y)〉 at random. In contrast, if Bob is honest, the
final state is deterministic. This observation suggests that Alice should repeat
the computation twice and compare the resulting states received back from Bob
to determine whether Bob cheated.
Remark 2. One may think that quantum private query [10] can be used for
our task here. But actually it is not appropriate because in this task, it requires
(1) entanglement of all qubits, (2) quantum storages to store quantum states
for a while, and (3) some public ~x0 with f(~x0) = 0 for any f . The first two
requirements increase the difficulty for implementation, and usually the third
cannot be satisfied in machine learning.
3.2 Notations in Our Protocol
We now present our protocol by expanding the above basic idea. First, let us
define some notations. As usual in quantum computing, to compute the function
f : Rk → {0, 1} we assume a unitary operator Uf with Uf |0〉|~x〉 = |0〉|~x〉 and
Uf |1〉|~x〉 = (−1)f(~x)|1〉|~x〉 for any ~x ∈ Rk. Indeed, Uf can be seen as a Z gate
controlled by an oracle that computes f . In this paper, the only useful input to
Uf is |+〉|~x〉, and Uf transforms |+〉 to |−〉 if and only if f(~x) = 1:
Uf |+〉|~x〉 =
{
|+〉|~x〉 if f(~x) = 0,
|−〉|~x〉 if f(~x) = 1. (2)
The first qubit carrying |+〉 is called the result qubit, and the other qubits are
called the data qubits. Suppose each component of ~x is represented by an n-bit
string. Then ~x ∈ {0, 1}nk.
In order to detect Bob’s attack, Alice needs to prepare a testing input state
by the following steps:
1. She generates a state
|ψ(~y, 0, 0)〉 = |+〉|~y〉, (3)
where ~y = y1 · · · yk ∈ {0, 1}nk is drawn uniformly at random;
2. She entangles the result qubit with the first data qubit by applying a
CNOT gate on them;
3. With probability 1/2, she applies a Z gate on the result qubit, obtaining
|ψ(~y, u, 1)〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|y1〉+(−1)u|1〉|2n−1⊕y1〉)|y2 · · · yk〉, where u ∈ {0, 1}
is generated uniformly at random, and ⊕ denotes the addition modulo 2;
4. She randomly swaps the first data qubit and any other data qubit, thus
obtaining
|ψ(~y, u,m)〉 = USWAP (1,m)|ψ(~y, u, 0)〉, (4)
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where m is chosen from {1, · · · , kd} uniformly at random. It is worth
noting that from Eqs. (2) and (3), |ψ(~x, 0, 0)〉 = |+〉|~x〉 is a state for the
computation. So, |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 can be used to represent either a test state
(m > 0) or a computational state (m = 0).
3.3 System Description
Now we can present our data system for computing f(~xi). In order to compute
f(~xi), Bob needs to query the data system to get access to ~xi. Once Bob queries
the data system, it answers three quantum states in sequence and requires Bob
to send back each state after his action. The second (resp. third) state is sent
once the first (resp. second) state is received back from Bob after his actions.
The procedure of this data system to answer ~xi is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 calls procedure AliceCompute three times, among which two are
devoted to detecting Bob’s attack and one to computing f(~x). In procedure
AliceCompute, we use Z0 to indicate the Z gate on the result qubit. The
controlled-NOT gate UCNOT is applied on the result qubit and the first data
qubit, with the former being the control qubit.
Algorithm 1: Quantum privacy preserving data system to solve Prob-
lem 1. Executed by Alice.
Input : ~x
1 begin
2 Generates uniformly at random i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ~y ∈ {0, 1}nk, u ∈ {0, 1},
and m ∈ {1, · · · , nk};
3 Consecutively executes the procedure AliceCompute three times, the
i-th time with data-input (~x, 0, 0) and the other two with test-input
(~y, u,m);
4 If different results are obtained from the two test executions, then
terminates the protocol;
5 Otherwise, sends the execution result of the procedure with
data-input to Bob;
6 end
4 Privacy Analysis for Algorithm 1
In this section, we show how privacy is preserved in Algorithm 1. In order for
a better understanding, let us start with two examples.
4.1 Examples of Attacks
Bob’s attacks take place in Procedure BobCompute. He can perform measure-
ments or use controlled-NOT gate and additional qubits to entangle the data
qubits, instead of applying Uf honestly.
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Procedure AliceCompute(~y, u,m). Executed by Alice.
Input : ~y ∈ {0, 1}nk, u ∈ {0, 1},m ∈ {1, · · · , nk}
1 begin
2 Prepares |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 in Eq.(4);
3 Calls procedure BobCompute with parameter |ψ(~y, u,m)〉, and let |ϕ〉
be the returned quantum state from Bob;
4 Applies UCNOTZ
u
0USWAP (1,m) on |ϕ〉;
5 Measures all data qubits of |ϕ〉 with basis {|0〉, |1〉}. If the outcome is
not ~y, terminates the entire protocol;
6 Measures the remaining qubit of |ϕ〉 with basis {|+〉, |−〉}. If the
outcome is |+〉, then return 0; otherwise return 1;
7 end
Procedure BobCompute(|ψ〉). (Executed by Bob)
Input : a state |ψ〉 (received from Alice) in HR ⊗HD
1 begin
2 Applies Uf on |ψ〉 to obtain |ϕ〉 = Uf |ψ〉;
3 Returns (Sends back to Alice) |ϕ〉;
4 end
Example 4.1 (Attack by measurements). Suppose Bob tries to get Alice’s pri-
vate information ~x by performing measurements on the data qubits. That is, in-
stead of following the protocol, he does the following two steps to replace Line 2
in procedure BobCompute:
2.1 Measures all data qubits of |ψ〉 with basis {|0〉, |1〉};
2.2 Records the measurement outcome z ∈ {0, 1}nk and let |ϕ〉 be the post-
measurement state of the system;
Unfortunately for him, he may attack on a test state |ψ(~y, u,m)〉. We take
m = 1 and u = 0 as an example. Then the test state is
|ψ(~y, 0, 1)〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|y1〉+ |1〉|2n−1 ⊕ y1〉)|y2 · · · yk〉.
The state |ϕ〉 Alice receives will be |0〉|y1〉|y2 · · · yk〉 or |1〉|2n−1 ⊕ y1〉|y2 · · · yk〉
with a fifty-fifty chance. Note that UCNOTZ
u
0USWAP (1,m) = UCNOT (as u = 0,
m = 1). Alice will get |0〉|~y〉 or |1〉|~y〉. In either case, the measurement outcome
on the result qubit (Line 5 in procedure AliceCompute) will be |+〉 or |−〉 with
equal probability. Thus, no matter what Bob does in the other calls of procedure
BobCompute, the probability that g1 6= g2 is 0.5q+0.5(1−q) = 0.5, where q is the
probability that the outcome in the other call is |+〉. This means that the attack
will be detected with probability 0.5. The general case for m > 1 is similar.
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One trick for Bob to pass the test is to guess m and u. However, since m
and u are generated uniformly at random, the probability that he guesses m and
u correctly is only 12nk . Another trick is to perform measurements only on part
of the data qubits. This reduces the probability to be detected, but at the same
time decreases the obtained information as well.
Example 4.2 (Attack by entangling the data qubits to new ancilla qubits).
A more sophisticated attack for Bob is to add nk blank qubits, and use CNOT
gate to copy information. However, he will still be detected if he unfortunately
attacks on a test state. Again, take m = 1 and u = 0 as an example. The state
in procedure AliceCompute with the input parameters (~y, 0, 1) evolves as follows:
1. After Bob’s attack, it becomes
1√
2
(|0〉|~y〉|~y〉+ |1〉|2n−1 ⊕ y1〉|y2 · · · yk〉|2n−1 ⊕ y1〉|y2 · · · yk〉).
2. Alice performs UCNOT on the first nk + 1 qubits and gets
1√
2
(|0〉|~y〉|~y〉+ |1〉|~y〉|2n−1 ⊕ y1〉|y2 · · · yk〉).
3. The measurement outcomes are |+〉|~y〉 or |−〉|~y〉 each with probability 1/2.
Similarly to the previous example, this attack will be detected with probability
1/2.
4.2 Theoretical Analysis
In general, it is very hard to precisely define Bob’s cheat behaviour because Alice
is just a data system and does not know what Bob will do. On the other hard,
since the training examples are stored in quantum state, dishonest Bob has to
perform measurements to read out information. So, it is reasonable to define
Bob’s cheat as measurements, no matter these measurements are performed
before or after he sending states back to Alice. Then the theoretical privacy
analysis of Algorithm 1 can be concluded as the following theorem. This theorem
shows that Algorithm 1 achieves a kind of cheat-sensitive security, which is
defined in [13].
Theorem 4.1. In Algorithm 1, once Bob performs measurements (in his action,
Procedure BobCompute) on Alice’s state or entangles new qubits to this state, it
will be detected with positive probability.
The above theorem only gives a qualitative analysis. To analyse the algo-
rithm quantitatively, we turn to compute the expected privacy amount of the
entire database after the whole machine learning procedure. The privacy metric
we employed here is that given in Definition 2.1. The confidence we choose in
this paper is 95%. In order to estimate that an attribute xi,j is in some interval
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with confidence 95%, Bob has to perform measurements on first qubits of xi,j
with bases close to {|0〉, |1〉}. (If the confidence is chosen to be 100%, the basis
should exactly be {|0〉, |1〉}.) To simplify the presentation, we assume that Bob
always performs measurements with basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Then we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Assume in Algorithm 1 each attribute xi,j is represented by a
n-bit binary string, where n1 bits are before the decimal mark and n − n1 are
after. Suppose Bob performs measurements with basis {|0〉, |1〉} on some qubits
to reduce its privacy amount. Then
1. if the privacy amount of xi,j is reduced from 2
n1 to 2n1−n2 with confidence
at least 95%, Bob’s cheat will be detected with probability n2−12nk .
2. if the privacy amount of each attribute of ~xi is reduced to 2
n1−n2 with
confidence at least 95%, Bob’s cheat will be detected with probability n2k−12nk .
5 Quantum Privacy-Preserving Perceptron
Our quantum privacy-preserving data system for computing f(~x) is presented
in Section 3 and carefully analysed in Section 4. Now we use it to develop a
quantum privacy-preserving perceptron algorithm.
5.1 Sketch of Quantum Perceptron
In this subsection, we give a brief description of our protocol. The original
(classical) perceptron algorithm has only two steps, i.e. S1 and S2 in Figure 1
involving the database (training set) D. So, if we want to expand it in order to
preserve privacy, certain modifications should be introduced in these two steps.
Usually a classical protocol preserves privacy by adding noise into the original
data: ~x′ = ~x+ ~τ , and the training set D is distorted to D′. Then the data user
reconstructs the original data distribution based on D′ and the way that τ
is generated. Finally the learning algorithm is executed on the reconstructed
distribution [2].
The idea in our algorithm is quite different. The sketch of this protocol
is presented in Fig. 2, and the detailed algorithm is given as Algorithm 2 in
Appendix B. Here, we explain some key points in our protocol:
• At the beginning of each outer loop, Alice permutes her database. This is
done by first generating a private random number u ∈ {0, 1}logN . Then
each index i is replaced by i⊕ u, the bit-by-bit XOR of i and u.
• In the S1 step, Algorithm 1 is employed on the permutated database based
on the original database D to preserve the original training data.
• In the S2 step, a distorted training example ~x′ = ~xi⊕u+~r is published for
updating ~w and b:
~w← ~w + (ci⊕u − d)~x′ and b← b+ ci⊕u − d. (5)
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• Bob initializes ~w = 0 and b = 0.
• Alice and Bob execute the following steps until no update happens.
– Alice secretly generates u ∈ {0, 1}logN uniformly at random.
– For i = 1, · · · , N , do the following two steps:
1. Alice secretly generates ~r by her private random number gener-
ator and then sends c′ = ci⊕u and ~x′ = ~xi⊕u + ~r to Bob.
2. (Step S1) Bob calculates d = f(~xi⊕u) with current ~w and b on
Alice’s quantum data system, i.e., Algorithm 1.
3. (Step S2) If d 6= c′, Bob updates ~w ← ~w + (c′ − d)~x′ and b ←
b+ (c′ − d).
• Bob gets the final ~w and b.
Figure 2: The sketch of quantum privacy-preserving perceptron algorithm.
In this step, ~r is generated by random number generator R(δ), where δ is
a parameter. Here
– the details of R(δ) including δ are kept secret by Alice;
– the only requirement for R and information known by Bob is that
the mean value of random numbers generateor is 0.
The privacy analysis will be given later in Section 5.2. Here we first prove
the correctness of our algorithm. Since a distorted training example is used to
update w and b, the correctness of our algorithm is not obvious. Fortunately, it
can be proved in a way similar to [18].
Theorem 5.1. Suppose (1) a random number generator of mean 0 is employed
in Step S2 in Algorithm 2, and (2) the original perceptron learning algorithm
(Fig. 1 or [9, 22]) terminates. Then Algorithm 2 will eventually terminate and
generate a correct classifier on the same training set.
This theorem implies that the correctness is independent of the choice of
the random number generator. Therefore, Alice can keep the random number
generator secret. This is very different from the classical case. In the classical
machine learning situations (for instance [2]), it has to be published to Bob to
guarantee the correctness of the final results.
To give a direct view and show the influence of different random number
generator on our quantum protocol, numerical experiments are carried out with
several different generators and shown in Table 1. These experiments are done
on three different training sets, which are generated in three different ways. All
the numerical results are averaged over 100 executions due to the randomness of
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Generator Description
R0(δ) Uniform distribution from [−δ, δ].
R1(δ)
Generate r according to R0(δ).
If r > 0 then r ← r + 0.5δ, and if r < 0 then r ← r − 0.5δ.
R2(δ)
Generate r according to R0(δ).
If r > 0 then r ← 2r, and if r < 0 then r ← r − 0.5δ.
R3(δ) Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation δ.
R4(δ)
Generate r according to R3(δ).
If r > 0 then choose r from (0, 1.5934δ] uniformly randomly.
Table 1: Random generators in numerical experiments. In practice, all the
numbers are rounded to a precision of 1/1024.
our quantum protocol. Our protocol succeeds with probability 1 for all different
random number generators and all δ = 11024 ,
1
512 , · · · , 128.
Example 5.1. Consider three training sets shown in Fig. 3(a), (c) and (e).
The corresponding running rounds of Algorithm 2 on these sets are given in
subfigures (b), (d) and (f) respectively. The terminating and success probabilities
for these situations are all 1. (See Section 5.2.2 for descriptions of terminating
and success probabilities.)
1. Subfigure (a). In this case, training examples corresponding to different
classes are independently generated by normal distributions on both coor-
dinates.
2. Subfigure (c). In this case, training examples are first generated by normal
distributions on both coordinates. Then w0 = (2,−1) and b0 = −3 are
employed to set classes for all training examples.
3. Subfigure (e). In this case, each ~xi = (xi,1, xi,2) and ci are generated in
three steps: (1) uniformly at random choose r1 ∈ [0, 0.5] and r2 ∈ [0, 8],
(2) xi,2 ← r2 and xi,1 ← xi,2 + r1, (3) with a fifty-fifty chance, set ci = 0
or set c1 = 1 and xi,1 ← xi,1 + 1.5.
In these figures, when the parameter δ is not big, the running time (i.e., the
average number of running rounds) may not change, and when δ is bigger, the
running time increases with δ. Therefore, the results show δ only influence the
speed of our protocol.
5.2 Privacy Analysis for Quantum Protocol
In this subsection, we present the privacy analysis of our quantum privacy-
preserving perceptron protocol. We will first analyse the privacy metric of our
quantum protocol, and then compare it with classical randomization methods.
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(a) Training set 1. (b) Average running rounds on training set 1.
(c) Training set 2. (d) Average running rounds on training set 2.
(e) Training set 3. (f) Average running rounds on training set 3.
Figure 3: (a, c, e): Training sets in Example 5.1. The (blue) circles and (red)
dots are training examples corresponding to different sets respectively. The
solid (green) lines are the classifier generated on this set by original perceptron
algorithm (see Fig. 1 or [9, 22]). (b, d, f): Average running rounds of our
quantum protocol on these training sets. Ri means different random random
number generator in Table 1.
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5.2.1 Quantum Protocol
In our quantum protocol, there are mainly two ways to leak private information.
The first one happens when computing d = f(~xi⊕u) at Step S1, and the second
happens in the distorted training example ~x′ used to update w and b at Step
S2.
For Step S1, a quantitative analysis for each training example is given in
Theorem 4.2. The quantitative analysis for the entire database can be derived
based on this. Recall in Theorem 4.2, n1 denotes the number of bits before
the decimal mark of each attribute. At this step, we say that Bob successfully
attacks one training example at level 2n1−n2 with confidence 95%, if he perform
measurements with basis {|0〉, |1〉} to reduce privacy amount of each attribute of
this training example to 2n1−n2 . Then from Theorem 4.2, we have the following:
Corollary 5.1. During the whole learning procedure in Fig. 2 (or Algorithm 2),
the number of training examples that Bob can successfully attack at level 2n1−n2
with at least confidence 95% before being detected is
2n
n2
+
2n
n2(n2k − 1) − 1 (6)
on average.
The number in (6) is independent of the size N of the training set. Usually
N ≫ n for a large database. So only a tiny part of the entire database will be
leaked at this step.
Now we consider Step S2. The most important thing to protect privacy in
this step is that
• Alice keeps her random number generator R(δ) and the parameter δ secret.
This fact ensures that Bob is not able to get the distribution of x directly from
x′. We can explain it by a simple example. Suppose original data X is a
uniformly distributed random variable, and noise Y is a random variable with
a normal distribution. Alice publishes some samples of distorted data X + Y .
Then since Bob does not know any information about Y , he cannot distinguish
the following two situations:
1. The original data is X , and the noise is Y .
2. The original data is Y , and the noise is X .
Obviously, there are many other variables X ′ and Y ′ with various distributions,
whose composition X ′ + Y ′ has the same distribution with X + Y . Therefore,
Bob cannot get any information about ~xi simply from ~x
′
i, if Alice keeps her
random number generator secret.
For convenience of the comparison in the following subsection, we need to
quantify the privacy amount in Step S2. Note that if Bob does not cheat, the
privacy amount for ~xi is at least 0.95δ with confidence 95%. This is because
(1) in our protocol, Bob does not know any information about random number
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generator R(δ), and (2) even if he knows δ and R(δ) is R0(δ), the privacy
amount is 1.9δ/2 = 0.95δ with confidence 95% (R0(δ) leads to 1.9δ, and one-bit
information of f(~xi) halves it).
5.2.2 Comparison with the Classical Methods
In this subsection, we compare our quantum protocol with the known classical
methods for a similar task. In the two-party situation, a classical method, for
instance [2], works in the following way:
1. Randomization. Alice uses random number generator R to add noise
into D to produce a distorted database D′. Then Alice publishes R and
D′ to Bob.
2. Reconstruction. Bob employs R and D′ to reconstruct an estimated
distribution D˜ of original training examples in D.
3. Learning. Bob finishes the learning task on D˜.
In [2], it is shown that the reconstruction method works well for some situations.
Unfortunately, it does not work for our problem, for instance, training sets in
Fig. 3(c) and 3(e). This is because the reconstruction in [2] requires that
for every class, different attributes are not strongly related. Otherwise, the
one-dimensional reconstruction method in [2] will not correctly estimate the
distributions of attributes one by one. Since it is beyond the scope of this
paper, we are not going to further discuss this weakness.
An alternative method follows [2]. But one step further, distributions of all
attributes are estimated once together, not one by one. This method works
much better, but still worse than our quantum protocol. Moreover, the most
important weakness of this method is its complexity. It will be exponential
on the number k of attributes. See Appendix C for more discussions of these
reconstruction methods.
Due to the weakness of the reconstruction, let us compare our quantum
protocol with classical randomization methods without reconstruction. Totally,
we consider the following four methods:
• Uniformly distributed noise from [−δ, δ] without reconstruction.
• Normally distributed noise of mean 0 and standard deviation 0.484δ with-
out reconstruction.
• Uniformly distributed noise from [−δ, δ] with reconstruction for attributes
one by one.
• Uniformly distributed noise from [−δ, δ] with reconstruction for attributes
once together.
As stated in [2], all these methods has the same privacy amount 1.9δ with
confidence 95%. The comparison is based on the terminating probabilities and
success probabilities:
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• Termination. We say that one execution of a classical or quantum protocol
terminates, if and only if it terminates in T = 40000 outer loops.
• Success. We say that one execution of a classical or quantum protocol suc-
ceeds, if and only if it terminates (in 40000 outer loops) and the resulting
classifier classifies D correctly.
The comparison is given in Fig. 4. The results show that when we require high
privacy level, our quantum protocol still works perfectly, but classical methods
can hardly work. This indicates that our quantum protocol can preserve privacy
much better than classical methods.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we develop a privacy-preserving quantum algorithm to compute a
general linear function f(~x) and then apply it to machine learning based on per-
ceptron. The performance of our algorithm has been analysed both theoretically
and numerically. The main features of our algorithm include:
• Classical databases versus quantum database: The quantum algo-
rithms for search [12], counting [5], machine learning [14, 15, 20, 26] and
private queries [10] all require a quantum database, for instance, in the
form of quantum random access memory [11]. However, our quantum al-
gorithm is executed on classical databases, and no quantum database is
required. So, our algorithm is much easier to implement.
• Less entanglement: For example, the quantum algorithms presented in
[12, 5, 14] require that all the working qubits are entangled, and it lasts for
O(
√
N) rounds. In contrast, our algorithm requires much less entangled
qubits, and the entanglement during the communication and computation
only needs to last very shortly for one round. Indeed, in calling procedure
AliceCompute to compute f(~x) in Algorithm 1, Alice sends a separable
state |+〉|~x〉 to Bob and Bob sends |+〉|~x〉 or |−〉|~x〉 back to Alice. There
is no entanglement during this communication. Meanwhile, when Bob
computes f(~x) on this separable state, Bob may reduce the number of
entangled qubits to a small number, say n. Moreover, this entanglement
only needs to last for one computational round. Even in a test which
employs certain entangled states to detect dishonesty, only two qubits are
entangled during the communication, and the entanglement only lasts for
one round as well. So, our algorithm might be implementable using the
intermediate quantum computing technology.
To conclude the paper, we consider some possibilities of extending our algo-
rithm for more applications. First, it can be applied to a more general artificial
neural network; for example, a feed forward neural network employing nonlinear
neurons [16]. Since these nonlinear functions can be decomposed into a linear
function followed by a nonlinear one, our algorithm can be directly used to the
16
(a) Terminating probabilities of training set 1. (b) Success probabilities of training set 1.
(c) Terminating probabilities of training set 2. (d) Success probabilities of training set 2.
(e) Terminating probabilities of training set 3. (f) Success probabilities of training set 3.
Figure 4: The comparison of our quantum protocol with four classical methods
on the training sets in Example 5.1. All classical methods with parameter δ here
have the same privacy level 1.9δ with confidence 95%. Our quantum protocol
i.e., R0 in the figures, has privacy level at least 1.9δ with confidence 95%.
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linear part of the input level of a network. A similar idea applies to the back-
propagation algorithm [16]. Second, our algorithm can be generalised to deal
with several machine learning and data mining tasks where a linear or boolean
function is used, for instance decision tree learning [2, 19] and association rule
mining [8].
References
[1] Rakesh Agrawal, Alexandre Evfimievski, and Ramakrishnan Srikant. Infor-
mation sharing across private databases. In Proceedings of the 2003 ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, SIGMOD ’03,
pages 86–97, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[2] Rakesh Agrawal and Ramakrishnan Srikant. Privacy-preserving data min-
ing. In Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMOD International Conference
on Management of Data, SIGMOD ’00, pages 439–450, New York, NY,
USA, 2000. ACM.
[3] Dorit Aharonov, Amnon Ta-Shma, Umesh V Vazirani, and Andrew C Yao.
Quantum bit escrow. In Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM sym-
posium on Theory of computing, pages 705–714. ACM, 2000.
[4] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public
key distribution and coin tossing. Theoretical computer science, 560:7–11,
2014.
[5] Gilles Brassard, Peter Høyer, and Alain Tapp. Quantum counting. In
KimG. Larsen, Sven Skyum, and Glynn Winskel, editors, Automata, Lan-
guages and Programming, volume 1443 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 820–831. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1998.
[6] Kamalika Chaudhuri and Claire Monteleoni. Privacy-preserving logistic
regression. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
289–296, 2009.
[7] Roger Colbeck and Adrian Kent. Variable-bias coin tossing. Phys. Rev. A,
73:032320, Mar 2006.
[8] Alexandre Evfimievski, Ramakrishnan Srikant, Rakesh Agrawal, and Jo-
hannes Gehrke. Privacy preserving mining of association rules. Information
Systems, 29(4):343 – 364, 2004.
[9] Yoav Freund and Robert E Schapire. Large margin classification using the
perceptron algorithm. Machine learning, 37(3):277–296, 1999.
[10] Vittorio Giovannetti, Seth Lloyd, and Lorenzo Maccone. Quantum private
queries. Phys. Rev. Lett., 100:230502, Jun 2008.
18
[11] Vittorio Giovannetti, Seth Lloyd, and Lorenzo Maccone. Quantum random
access memory. Phys. Rev. Lett., 100:160501, Apr 2008.
[12] Lov K. Grover. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search.
In Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, STOC ’96, pages 212–219, New York, NY, USA, 1996. ACM.
[13] Lucien Hardy and Adrian Kent. Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment.
Phys. Rev. Lett., 92:157901, Apr 2004.
[14] Ashish Kapoor, Nathan Wiebe, and Krysta Svore. Quantum perceptron
models. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
3999–4007, 2016.
[15] Seth Lloyd, Masoud Mohseni, and Patrick Rebentrost. Quantum algo-
rithms for supervised and unsupervised machine learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1307.0411, 2013.
[16] Michael A Nielsen. Neural networks and deep learning. URL:
http://neuralnetworksanddeeplearning.com/, 2015.
[17] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum
information. Cambridge, 2010.
[18] Albert BJ Novikoff. On convergence proofs for perceptrons. Technical
report, DTIC Document, 1963.
[19] J. Ross Quinlan. Induction of decision trees. Machine learning, 1(1):81–106,
1986.
[20] Patrick Rebentrost, Masoud Mohseni, and Seth Lloyd. Quantum support
vector machine for big data classification. Phys. Rev. Lett., 113:130503, Sep
2014.
[21] Francesco Ricci, Lior Rokach, and Bracha Shapira. Introduction to recom-
mender systems handbook. Springer, 2011.
[22] Frank Rosenblatt. The perceptron: A probabilistic model for information
storage and organization in the brain. Psychological review, 65(6):386, 1958.
[23] Jaideep Vaidya and Chris Clifton. Privacy preserving association rule
mining in vertically partitioned data. In Proceedings of the eighth ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data min-
ing, pages 639–644. ACM, 2002.
[24] Aad W Van der Vaart. Asymptotic statistics. Cambridge university press,
2000.
[25] Michael J. Wichura. Lecture notes.
https://galton.uchicago.edu/˜wichura/Stat304/Handouts/L12.cf2.pdf.
19
[26] Nathan Wiebe, Ashish Kapoor, and Krysta M Svore. Quantum deep learn-
ing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.3489, 2014.
[27] David Williams. Probability with martingales. Cambridge university press,
1991.
[28] Shenggang Ying, Mingsheng Ying, and Yuan Feng. Quantum privacy-
preserving data mining. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.04009v2, 2015.
[29] Shenggang Ying, Mingsheng Ying, and Yuan Feng. Quantum privacy-
preserving data analytics. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.04420, 2017.
20
A Proofs for Theorems
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof depends on three lemmas. The proofs of these lemmas are organised
in several subsections. We starts from the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Suppose Alice sends |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 to Bob. Here u and m may be
0 to represent a computational state. If Bob wants to always pass tests with
certainty, the states he sends back to Alice should be separable from any other
additional quibts. Moreover it should be either |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 or Z0|ψ(~y, u,m)〉,
where Z0 is the Z-gate on the result qubit.
From this lemma, one can find that if Bob wants to always pass tests with
certainty by directly sending back the states after his actions, the only operator
that he can perform is an identity operator or a Z-gate on the result qubit. This
indicates that
• Bob cannot get private information and always pass tests with certainty
by directly sending back states simultaneously.
What happens if he performs measurements to read private information, and
then constructs a new state and sends it back to Alice? We can prove that he
cannot always pass tests in this way. The proof is based on the following two
lemmas.
Lemma A.2. Suppose Bob constructs a measurement {Mv : v} to distinguish
the test states. If Bob gets measurement outcome v, then the probability that
|ψ(y, u,m)〉 is the test state is at most 1
nk
, i.e.
Pr(|ψ(~y, u,m)〉 | Mv) ≤ 1
nk
.
Lemma A.3. Suppose Bob gets measurement outcome v and constructs a test
state based on this outcome. If he sends back this new state back to Alice, the
success probability to pass the test is at most nk+34nk .
Therefore, we conclude that
• Bob cannot pass tests with certainty by performing measurements and
then reconstructing a test state.
and thus complete the proof.
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma A.1
We first prove that the nk + 1 qubits that Bob sends back to Alice should be
separable from any other additional qubits, if Bob wants to always pass tests
with certainty. Since any mixed state can be purified by adding a new system,
we assume without loss of generality Bob holds state
|φ〉 =
∑
αi,z|i〉|z〉|ξi,z〉
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after his actions, where i ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ {0, 1}nk. Then Bob sends the first nk+
1 bits (i.e., the first two subsystems) back to Alice. After UCNOTZ
u
0USWAP (1,m),
Alice gets the first nk + 1 qubits of UCNOTZ
u
0USWAP (1,m)⊗ I|φ〉. Since Line
5 in procedure AliceCompute should be always passed, the state on the data
qubits should be |~y〉 with certainty. So this state has the following form:
UCNOTZ
u
0USWAP (1,m)⊗ I|φ〉 = β|+〉|~y〉|ξ0〉+ τ |−〉|~y〉|ξ1〉.
Moreover, in order to pass Line 4 in Algorithm 1, we should have |β| = 1 or
|τ | = 1. As the operator UCNOTZu0USWAP (1,m) only works on the result and
data qubits, |φ〉 can be rewritten as
|φ〉 =
∑
αi,z|i〉|z〉|ξ〉 =
{
(USWAP (1,m)Z
u
0UCNOT |+〉|~y〉)|ξ〉,
(USWAP (1,m)Z
u
0UCNOT |−〉|~y〉)|ξ〉.
(7)
Thus, the first nk + 1 qubits are isolated.
Secondly we prove that Bob’s operators are equivalent to I or Z0. Observe
that the operator Z0 commutes with USWAP (1,m)Z
u
0UCNOT and |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 =
(USWAP (1,m)Z
u
0UCNOT )|+〉|~y〉. So, from Eq. (7) we have
|φ〉 = |ψ(~y, u,m)〉|ξ〉, or |φ〉 = Z0|ψ(~y, u,m)〉|ξ〉.
This completes the proof.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma A.2
The idea of this proof comes from the fact that Bm′ = {|ψ(~y′, u′,m′)〉 : ∀~y′, u′}
forms an orthonormal basis for each m′.
In this proof, we use q = Pr(|ψ(~y, u,m)〉) to denote the probability that the
test state is |ψ(~y, u,m)〉. Since the test is generated uniformly at random, we
have:
q = Pr(|ψ(~y, u,m)〉) = 1
2nk2nk
for any test state. On the other hand, the probability Pr(Mv | |ψ(~y, u,m)〉) that
the outcome is v when the current state is |ψ(~y, u,m)〉 is
Pr(Mv | |ψ(~y, u,m)〉) = tr(M †vMv|ψ(~y, u,m)〉〈ψ(~y, u,m)|).
Consequently, the probability Pr(Mv) that the outcome is v is
Pr(Mv) =
∑
~y′,u′,m′
Pr(Mv | |ψ(~y′, u′,m)〉) Pr(|ψ(~y′, u′,m′)〉)
=
∑
~y′,u′,m′
qtr(M †vMv|ψ(~y′, u′,m′)〉〈ψ(~y′, u′,m′)|)
=
∑
m′
qtr(M †vMv) = nkqtr(M
†
vMv).
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In the above equation, the last step comes from the fact thatBm′ = {|ψ(~y′, u′,m′)〉 :
∀~y′, u′} is an orthonormal basis. Therefore, we have:
Pr(|ψ(~y, u,m)〉 | Mv) ≤
∑
~y′,u′
Pr(|ψ(~y′, u′,m)〉 | Mv)
=
∑
~y′,u′
Pr(Mv | |ψ(~y′, u′,m)〉) Pr(|ψ(~y′, u′,m)〉)
Pr(Mv)
=
1
nk
.
This completes the proof.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma A.3
Suppose the correct state is |ψ(~y, u,m)〉, and Bob constructs |ψ(~y′, u′,m′)〉. We
consider the following two cases:
Case 1. m = m′: In this case, Bob can construct a correct test state with
~y = ~y′ and u = u′, as he can perform measurements to read out ~y′ and u′. The
success probability is 1.
Case 2. m 6= m′: Without loss of generality, we assume ~y = ~0, u = 0, m = 1
and m′ = 2. Then with probability 0.5, Alice gets measurement outcomes 0 on
the result qubit and ~0 on the data qubits. Or with probability 0.5, Alice gets
measurement outcomes 1 on the result qubit and 1110 · · · on the data qubits.
The latter situation will be detected at Line 5. So the total probability to pass
the test is 0.5 ∗ 0.5 = 0.25.
By Theorem A.2 and its proof, the first case happens with probability at
most 1
nk
. So in conclusion, the success probability in total is at most
1
nk
∗ 1 + nk − 1
nk
∗ 1
4
=
nk + 3
4nk
.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Firstly, since Bob wants to estimate ~xi or ~xi,j with confidence at least 95%,
he has to perform measurements in each Procedure AliceCompute. Otherwise,
he has at least 13 probability to miss the true input data ~xi. So Bob performs
measurements on two test states |ψ(~y, u,m)〉.
Secondly, it is assumed the measurement basis is {|0〉, |1〉} because of the
95% confidence. Once Bob performs measurements on a qubit of a state, he
gets one-bit information about the state, and thus halves the privacy amount
of this state. So besides the one-bit information from the result f(~xi), Bob still
needs n2 − 1 bits for a single attribute (respectively n2k − 1 bits for an entire
training example).
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Thirdly, the probability that Bob’s cheat is detected is decided by the proba-
bility that measurements are performed on the chosen m-th qubit in test states.
Since m is chosen uniformly at random, the probability that it is measured is
n2−1
nk
(respectively n2k−1
nk
for an entire training example).
Finally, if Bob performs measurements with basis {|0〉, |1〉}, the probability
to be detected is 12 . This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Since the original perceptron algorithm terminates, there exists a linear classifier
~w∗ = (w∗1 , w
∗
2 , · · · , w∗k) and b∗, which correctly separates the training set [9, 18,
22].
We first introduce some notations:
• ω∗ = (w∗1 , w∗2 , · · · , w∗k, b∗), where ~w∗ = (w∗1 , w∗2 , · · · , w∗k).
• ωt = (wt,1, wt,2, · · · , wt,k, bt), where ~wt = (wt,1, wt,2, · · · , wt,k) and bt de-
note the ~w and b after t updates, i.e., Eq. (5) is applied t times.
• χt = (xit,1, xit,2, · · · , xit,k, 1), where ~xit = (xit,1, xit,2, · · · , xit,k) is the
originally training example used in Step S2 for t-th update. Correspond-
ingly, other variables ~r, ci⊕u and d in Eq. (5) for t-th update are repre-
sented similarly by ηt, yt, τt respectively.
• for simplicity, denote χ′t = (yt − τt)χt and η′t = (yt − τt)ηt. Note χt · χt =
χ′t · χ′t and η · η = η′t · η′t.
• Obviously, ω0 = 0 by initialization.
As the sizeN of training set is finite, we can further assume that ∀i, |~w∗·~xi+b∗| >
0. Then there exists γ > 0 and R > 0, such that
|ω∗ · χt| > γ, ‖χt‖ < R, ∀t. (8)
The above conditions are just the sufficient condition of the termination for the
original perceptron algorithm [18]. Moreover, Eq. (5) can be rewritten as
ωt = ωt−1 + (yt − τt)χt + (yt − τt)ηt = ωt−1 + χ′t + η′t. (9)
Then this proof works in a similar way as the original proof [18]. That is we
also employ Eq. (10) to bound t.
‖ω∗ · ωt‖ ≤ ‖ω∗‖‖ωt‖, ∀t. (10)
24
(1) For the left side, we have
ω∗ · ωt = ω∗ · ωt−1 + (yt − τt)ω∗ · χt + ω∗ · η′t
> ω∗ · ωt−1 + γ + ω∗ · η′t (as (yt − τt)ω∗ · χt > γ)
> ω∗ · ω0 + tγ +
t∑
i=1
ω∗ · η′i
= tγ +
t∑
i=1
ω∗ · η′i. (as ω0 = 0)
In the above equations, the fact (yt − τt)ω∗ · χt > γ is because
• If ω∗ · χt > 0, we have yt = 1. Since χt is employed for updating, it is
incorrectly classified by ωt−1, i.e., τt = 0. Thus by assumption, Eq. (8),
we have (yt − τt)ω∗ · χt > γ.
• If ω∗ · χt < 0, similarly yt = 0, τt = 1 and thus (yt − τt)ω∗ · χt > γ.
(2) For the right side, we have
‖ωt‖2 = ωt · ωt
= ωt−1 · ωt−1 + χt · χt + η′t · η′t + 2ωt−1 · χ′t + 2ωt−1 · η′t + 2χ′t · η′t
< ωt−1 · ωt−1 + χt · χt + η′t · η′t + 2ωt−1 · η′t + 2χ′t · η′t (as ωt−1 · χ′t < 0)
= ωt−1 · ωt−1 + χt · χt + η′t · η′t + 2ωt−2 · η′t + 2χ′t−1 · η′t + 2η′t−1 · η′t + 2χ′t · η′t
< ωt−2 · ωt−2 + χt−1 · χt−1 + η′t−1 · η′t−1 + χt · χt + η′t · η′t
+ 2ωt−2 · (η′t−1 + η′t) + 2χ′t−1 · (η′t−1 + η′t) + 2η′t−1 · η′t + 2χ′t · η′t
< · · ·
<
t∑
i=1
χi · χi + (
t∑
i=1
η′i) · (
t∑
i=1
η′i) + 2
t∑
i=1
χ′i · (
t∑
j=i
η′j)
< tR2 + (
t∑
i=1
η′i) · (
t∑
i=1
η′i) + 2
t∑
i=1
χ′i · (
t∑
j=i
η′j). (as ‖χi‖ < R)
(3) The third step is to analyse the randomness from both sides. This is
based on the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. Suppose {Xj} is a sequence of independent identically distributed
random variables with the same distribution as X with zero mean EX = 0.
Suppose ∀i ∈ N, ai ∈ [−R0, R0] and λi ∈ {−1, 1} only depend on X1, · · · , Xi−1,
where R0 is a positive constant real number. For all t, define random variables
Yt =
1
t
t∑
j=1
λjXj , Zt =
1
t2
t∑
i=1
ai(
t∑
j=i
λjXj) =
1
t2
t∑
j=1
λj(
j∑
i=1
ai)Xj .
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Then for any ǫ > 0, we have
lim
t→∞
Pr(‖Yt‖ > ǫ) = lim
t→∞
Pr(‖Zt‖ > ǫ) = 0.
The two results in this lemma can be both proved in a way similar to the
weak law of large numbers and the central limit theorem [24, 27], and can be
seen as typical excises of characteristic functions in text books, for instance,
[24, 27].
(4) Now we can complete the proof by contradiction. Suppose the algorithm
terminates with probability less than 1− ε with ε > 0. Then t can go to infinity
with probability ε. Since the attribute of ηi is independent of each other, by
Lemm A.4, we have for any ǫ > 0,
lim
t→∞
Pr(‖
t∑
i=1
η′i‖/t > ǫ) = 0, lim
t→∞
Pr(|
t∑
i=1
χ′i · (
t∑
j=i
η′j)|/t2 > ǫ) = 0.
Therefore, there exists a number T , such that for any t > T , we have
‖ω∗ · ωt‖ ≤ ‖ω∗‖‖ωt‖
⇒ tγ +
t∑
i=1
ω∗ · η′i < ‖ω∗‖
√√√√tR2 + ( t∑
i=1
η′i) · (
t∑
i=1
η′i) + 2
t∑
i=1
χ′i · (
t∑
j=i
η′j)
⇒ tγ − 0.1tγ < ‖ω∗‖
√
tR2 + 0.01t2γ2 + 0.2t2γ2/‖ω∗‖2
⇒ 0.5t2γ2 < ‖ω∗‖2tR2 ⇒ t < 2‖ω∗‖2R2/γ2,
holds with probability 1. Puting it in another way, t is bounded with probability
1. This is a contradiction!
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma A.4
Since the first one is very similar to the weak law of large numbers [24] and is
easier than the other, we only give the proof of the second result.
The key concept in this proof is characteristic functions. The characteristic
function of random variable X is defined as φX(ϑ) = Ee
√−1ϑX [24]. By the
basic properties of characteristic functions [24], we have
φZt(θ) = Π
t
j=1φ 1
t2
λj(
∑j
i=1
ai)Xj
(θ).
Since Xj is independent of
1
t2
λj(
∑j
i=1 ai), by [25, Theorem 3], we have
φ 1
t2
λj(
∑j
i=1
ai)Xj
(θ) = φXj (
1
t2
λj(
j∑
i=1
ai)θ).
Note, for any j < t,
1
t2
λj(
j∑
i=1
ai)θ = O(
1
t
), as t→∞.
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By [24, 27], we have if EX = 0,
φX(ϑ) = 1 + o(ϑ), as ϑ→ 0.
Thus for all θ,
φZt(θ) = Π
t
j=1φXj (
1
t2
λj(
j∑
i=1
ai)θ)
= Πtj=1(1 + o(
1
t2
λj(
j∑
i=1
ai)θ)) as t→∞
= Πtj=1(1 + o(
1
t
)) as t→∞
→ 1. as t→∞
This means the distribution of Zt trends to be the distribution of constant 0,
since φ(θ) = 1 is the characteristic function of constant 0 [24]. Then by Le´vy’s
theorem [27] and [24, Theorem 2.7], we complete the proof.
B Detailed Description of Quantum Privacy-Preserving
Perceptron Learning Algorithm
In this appendix, we present a detailed description of our quantum privacy-
preserving perceptron learning algorithm in Algorithm 2. Since noises is added,
this algorithm may not terminate. So we set an upper bound T of loops.
C Discussion on Classical Reconstruction Method
In Section 5.2, we mentioned that classical reconstruction method [2] is not
suitable for our problem. The reason is that since the method [2] reconstructs
the original distribution for each attribute one by one, it does not work correctly
when the attributes are strongly related. For instance, each training vector ~xi in
the three sets in Example 5.1 has two attributes ~xi = (xi,1, xi,2). This method
first estimates the probability density function h01 for the first attribute of class
0. And then it estimates h02, h
1
1, h
0
2 similarly. When estimating h
0
1, it first
computes
h˜01(I) =
1
N
|{i : yi = 0, x′i,1 = xi,1 + ri,1 ∈ I}|,
where I is an one-dimensional interval, and then estimates h01 based on h˜
0
1 and
the probability density function of noise ri,1. Therefore if the value xi,1 strongly
depends on the value xi,2, the estimated h
0
1 might be very different to the correct
one.
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Directly following [2], the original method can be modified to estimate the
distribution of two attributes together. First we can compute
h˜0(H) =
1
N
|{i : yi = 0, ~x′i ∈ H}|,
where H = I1 × I2 is a two-dimensional hypercube, and then estimate h0 based
on h˜0 and the distribution of noise.
We give a direct view of the results of these two different methods on the
training set in Example 5.1. The reconstructed training sets (for only one exe-
cution, not averaged) is shown in Fig. 5.
Obviously this modified two-dimensional method works better than the orig-
inal one-dimensional one. But unfortunately, based on the analysis in [2], its
time complexity is O(NLk), which is exponential on L, where L is the number
of one-dimensional intervals that one axis is divided into. For instance, if the
range of xi,1 is [-16,16] and we divides it into L = 20 intervals, then the total
number of hypercubes for training vectors ~x is L2 = 400.
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(a) 1D reconstruction, training set 1. (b) 2D reconstruction, training set 1.
(c) 1D reconstruction, training set 2. (d) 2D reconstruction, training set 2.
(e) 1D reconstruction, training set 3. (f) 2D reconstruction, training set 3.
Figure 5: Reconstructed training sets in Example 5.1.
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Algorithm 2: Quantum Privacy-Preserving Perceptron.
Parameters :Training set D,
the size N of D,
the upper bound T for the number of loops. // In the
numerical experiments in this paper, T is set to be 40000.
Output : ~w, b
1 begin
2 ~w ← 0, b← 0, ∆← 0;
3 for t = 1, · · · , T do
4 ∆← 0;
5 Alice privately generates u ∈ {0, 1}n;
6 for i = 1, · · · , N do
7 Bob sends i to Alice to query her data system;
8 Alice generates ~r by her private random number generater;
9 Alice sends c′ = ci⊕u and ~x′ = ~xi⊕u + ~r to Bob;
// Step S1
10 Alice runs her quantum data system (Algorithm 1) with input
i⊕ u to answer Bob;
11 Bob stores result f(~xi⊕u) in d;
// Step S2
12 if d 6= c′ then
13 ∆← ∆+ 1;
14 ~w← ~w + (c′ − d)~x′;
15 b← b + (c′ − d);
16 end
17 end
18 if ∆ == 0 then
19 Break;
20 end
21 return ~w, b;
22 end
23 end
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